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Income-tax Department
Edited

by

Stephen G. Rusk

The present personnel of the bureau of internal revenue seems to have lost
the viewpoint of the congress that enacted the original amortization section of
the revenue act of 1918. This act was made law after the armistice had been
signed and warfare had ended.
Realizing that those engaged in producing articles contributing to the prose
cution of the war had spent large sums at abnormally high costs to equip them
selves to speed up that production and were faced with imminent and great
losses upon the cessation of hostilities, by the cancellation of the war orders and
the necessity for rehabilitating their business to meet peace-time conditions,
congress sought to relieve them to some degree of the excessively high income
and profits taxes. This relief took the form of “ allowing a reasonable deduc
tion for the amortization of such part of the cost of such facilities (ships, build
ings, machinery and equipment) as has been borne by the taxpayer.”
This language is quite general in its terms, and it placed upon the commissioner
the task of interpreting what congress definitely intended. Knowing the sen
timent of congress as well as of the country at that time, the commissioner pro
mulgated a basis of computing amortization sustained by comparing the cost
of facilities purchased from April 6, 1917, to December 31, 1918, with what
these facilities would have cost at pre-war prices. In plainer terms, the com
missioner considered amortization the difference between the price paid during
the war and the price for which the same facilities could have been purchased
prior thereto. The language of the act did not contemplate that only those
who had government contracts were to be allowed amortization. It was for
all who had produced articles contributing to the prosecution of the world war.
It did not, therefore, seem to exclude those who were not producing arms, am
munition or means of transportation for the government’s forces. Even by
the strictest limitations of interpretation of the language of congress, it is evi
dent that others were to be granted amortization as well as those contracting
directly with the government.
Those who remember the tension upon producers during the war to produce
more, more and still more, that our forces might not suffer for want of equip
ment, would have little difficulty in determining whether or not a particular
facility had been acquired to aid in producing articles for the prosecution of the
war. Everyone was doing it because everyone intended to aid in the war. In the
year 1926, however, a person claiming amortization will find that the best, per
haps the only, test as to whether or not one was producing such articles is the
possession of a government contract. Under the language of the act of 1918,
the exclusion of others than those having had government contracts seems un
warranted. The proving of the taxpayer’s intent (whether or not the facility
was acquired with the intention of producing articles contributing to the prose
cution of the war) furthermore appears to be an unreasonable limitation.
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With the foregoing ideas in mind, solicitor’s memorandum requiring that
taxpayers claiming amortization should show continuous intent when govern
ment contract was signed and machinery acquired, seems to indicate further
limitations upon those entitled to the amortization deduction and appears as
evidence that the solicitor’s department does not remember that almost all
production was contributing to the prosecution of the war, and that if a tax
payer acquired facilities at that period he intended them for no other than war
purposes.
SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
Unlawful gains from illicit liquor dealing are taxable income. Omission of
such gains from income returned under oath, may be punished by prosecution
under both section 253, act of 1921, and section 125, criminal code. It is no
defense to a prosecution for a false return that the obvious intent of such prose
cution was to punish severely for illicit liquor selling. (Circuit court of appeals
for the secona district, Steinberg v. United States.)
A corporation exercising none of its corporate powers, but engaged only in
exchanging its stock for other stock, paying taxes and maintaining its corporate
existence was not “carrying on or doing business” to subject it to capital-stock
tax. (Circuit court of appeals for the third district, United States v. Three Forks
Coal Company.)
A lessee on an accrual basis may not take an expense deduction in 1919 on
account of contracting to pay a portion of the cost of alterations and improve
ments begun in 1919 where no payments were made until 1920, the year in
which the lease took effect. (United States district court, district of Massa
chusetts, in re Hatch.)
A corporation financing itself out of receipts, had no more than a nominal
capital under section 209, act of 1917, though in addition to receipts accumu
lated for expenditures during periods of small receipts it had paid in minimum
capital required for incorporation. (United States district court, eastern dis
trict of Pennsylvania, Park Amusement Co. v. McCaughn, collector.)
Failure to separate tax from sale price does not authorize beverage tax on
combined amount nor deprive taxpayer of right to establish the true measure
of the tax. (United States district court of Massachusetts, The Clicquot Club
Co. v. United States.)
Timers and coils which are just as applicable for use on machines other than
automobiles, are not distinctly parts of automobiles, so as to be taxable under
section 900 (3) acts of 1918 and 1921. (Court of claims of United States, At
water Kent Mfg. Co. v. United States.)
Corporation required to collect initiation tax and make reports and pay
ments to collector is proper party to sue for refund, especially when authorized
by member to sue, and it may receive by assignment the member’s interest in
the claim against the collector.
Initiation fees for so-called life memberships are subject to tax under section
801 of 1921 act, when yearly dues are required. Payments may not be claimed
to be for something else when the by-laws provide for life memberships, and the
tax imposed by section 801 of the 1921 act is an indirect, excise tax. (United
States district court, W. D. Michigan, S. D., Masonic Country Club of Western
Michigan v. Charles Holden, collector.)
“Most recently accumulated profits” from which distributions were made
under the act of 1917, include current earnings, which are to be judged from
the end of the fiscal year during which the income was received. “Distribu
tions made by a corporation” as used in section 31 (b) of the act of 1917,
means “dividends paid, ” making a dividend declared in 1916 payable and paid
in 1917, income to a shareholder in 1917, though he was on an accrual basis.
(Circuit court of appeals, sixth circuit, Routzahn, collector, v. F. H.
Mason.)
Where members of a partnership were in disagreement as to continuing
doubtful accounts and one partner agreed to stand any loss that might occur,
the firm is entitled to a deduction when the loss occurred. (United States
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district court, eastern district of Pennsylvania, Morris L. Parrish, et al. v. Led
erer, collector.)
Interest may be allowed in a judgment against the United States only until
the date of entry of such judgment, or of a final entry in case an appeal from
the judgment is taken. United States district court, eastern district of Michi
gan, Burrows, et al. v. Woodworth, collector.)
A power of attorney authorizing a representative to prosecute all claims
before the department to conclusion and adjustment, does not constitute a speci
fic assignment of the claims to the representative to cover an agreed contingent
percentage fee so as to enable him to restrain or to have set aside, an adjust
ment by crediting of the overpayment against taxes due from the taxpayer.
(Supreme court of the District of Columbia, Lucian C. Day v. Gera Mills, a
corporation, et al.)

TREASURY RULINGS
(T. D. 3879, June 2, 1926)
Article 13: Surtax on sale of mineral deposits.
Income Tax—Revenue Act of 1918—Decision of Court
Mines—Sales—Income—Surtax
In computing the surtax under section 211 (a) and (b) of the
revenue act of 1918 on the profit arising from the sale of mines,
the method prescribed by article 13 of Regulations 45 should be
followed.
The following decision of the United States district court for the northern
district of Texas in the cases of M. Fowler v. United States and Mrs. Darlie
Fowler v. United States is published for the information of internal-revenue
officers and others concerned.

United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
M. Fowler v. United States
Mrs. Darlie Fowler v. United States
[April 5, 1926]
Atwell, D. J.: In 1918 the plaintiffs, as man and wife, each received an
income of $88,934.01, subject to taxation under the revenue act of that year;
$41,572.90 each were derived from the sale of an oil property, the principal
value of which was demonstrated by exploitation and discovery work carried
on by them. The selling price of this property was $83,645.80; it had cost $500;
$41,822.90, therefore, went to Mr. Fowler, and a like sum to Mrs. Fowler. Each
was assessed and paid the sum of $28,502.81 income tax.
There is no dispute between the parties as to the amount of income. The
issue arises out of a construction of section 211 (b), which reads as follows:
“211. (b) In the case of a bona-fide sale of mines, oil or gas wells, or any
interest therein, where the principal value of the property has been demon
strated by prospecting, or exploration and discovery work done by the taxpayer,
the portion of the tax imposed by this section attributable to such sale shall
not exceed 20 per cent. of the selling price of such property or interest.”
The plaintiffs contend that the history of the amendment, as well as the plain
intent and wording thereof, demand that the taxpayer shall pay the normal tax
for the entire amount of net income; that he shall also pay the tax provided
in section 211 (a) and 211 (b); that this is calculated by figuring the amount
that would be due on the entire net income, including the amount derived by a
transaction which comes within section 211 (b), in accordance with the provi
sions of section 211 (a), and then by deducting from such amount the amount
found to be due under section 211 (a) on income not derived from a 211 (b)
transaction, and, if the remainder is greater than 20 per cent. of the cost price
of the transaction under 211 (b), then, and in that event, the amount shall be
that 20 per cent. of the cost price of 211 (b), instead of such remainder, and the
two added make the surtax due.
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The government calculation is based on article 13 of Regulations 45 by the
commissioner of internal revenue, which reads as follows:
“To determine the application of this provision to a particular case, the tax
payer should first compute the surtax in the ordinary way upon his net income,
including his net income from any such sale. The proportion of the surtax
indicated by the ratio which the taxpayer’s net income from the sale of the
property, or his interest therein computed as prescribed in article 715, bears
to his total net income, is the portion of the surtax attributable to such sale,
and, if it exceeds 20 per cent. of the selling price of the property or interest
such portion of the surtax shall be reduced to that amount.”
The board of tax appeals says that there are “three possible methods of
computing the tax;” that “a net income may be likened to a pile of dollars
from which the government proposed to take varying percentages,” the profit
from the sale of oil wells may be regarded as constituting the dollars, “at the
bottom of the pile,” and the balance of the income constitutes the dollars above
it on the same pile, is one theory. This would afford the taxpayer no relief,
because, while his oil-well dollars would be at the bottom of the pile they
would serve to boost all of his other dollars to a much higher taxable level.
“The profit from the sale of an oil well at the top of the pile with the dollars
from other income at the bottom would be most advantageous to the taxpayer,
since his other income would get the low rate, and then the higher rate for the
oil-well money at the top of the pile would be reduced by the provisions of
section 211 (b).”
The third method “places the profit from the sale of an oil well as a ratable
portion of each dollar in the pile.” By such an arrangement the taxpayer is
benefited by 211 (b) to the extent that the portion of the total tax attributable
to the profit on the oil well exceeds 20 per cent. of the sale profit.
The taxpayer, of course, wants the lowest tax that the law will allow.
There seems to be nothing in the law that authorizes a division of the
income of a taxpayer into separate parts so that each part will have the benefit
of the law surtax rates, unless section 211 (b) would result in that situation.
The suggestion is made that the regulation of the commissioner is to have
no application in a case where an absurdity would result. As, for instance,
when a taxpayer loses from other business, and such losses are offset by
gains from a sale of an oil well, the entire tax, when computed under section
211 (a), is attributable to such gain, and should be limited to the 20 per cent.
of the sale price of the well provided for in section 211(b).
Counsel for the plaintiffs call attention to this history of section 211 (b) as
disclosed in congressional records. It appears that the national petroleum
war service committee submitted section 211 (b) as proposed legislation for
the benefit of the discoverer. Likewise, the records disclose that before the
senate committee on finance there appeared a representative of the Mid-Con
tinent Oil & Gas Association, who made similar representations, as did also
another representative before the same committee. Likewise, The Texas Gulf
Coast and Louisiana Oil & Gas Association appeared. (Page 392, hearings
before the senate finance committee.) The senate finally adopted the bill
with the 20 per cent. provision in it, and at conference the house representa
tives receded, and an addition to the law was agreed upon substantially as
recommended by the petroleum interests. This was for the purpose of stimu
lating prospecting and exploitation, and that the law might be fair to the
prospector who had expended years and money in a fruitless search.
It may be conceded, therefore, that section 211 (b) was intended as a limi
tation upon surtaxes. That congress meant that the seller of a discovery
property should pay no more in surtaxes than 20 per cent. of the selling price
of the property.
Many economic considerations enter into the mind of the thoughtful legis
lator when framing tax laws. It is imperative, during war times, to stimu
late the oil industry. This stimulation is accomplished if the man who finds
can sell what he finds to the organization that can, by reason of its utilities,
place what he finds for the service of the nation. That the man who finds
is to be deprived of a large part of his profit through large surtaxes will prefer
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to hold what he finds. He has searched for years, fruitlessly, and it hardly
seems fair that one year’s triumph should carry such a large burden when
many years of failure have sharpened his experience and probably resulted
in his successful search.
A very sensible way to look at the tax on one’s income is to tax the entire
income. Such an entirety includes whatever the taxpayer has received.
Some of the axioms which must be in the mind of the court when seeking
the righteousness of a tax case, are (a) the intent of the law-making body
(26 R. C. L., 960); (b) doubt in a tax law shall be resolved in favor of the
taxpayer (Gould, v. Gould, 245 U. S., 151; United States v. Wigglesworth, 2
Story, 368; Benziger v. U. S., 192 U. S., 38; American Net & Twine Co. v.
Worthington, 141 U. S., 468; Smietanka v. First Trust & Savings Bank, 257
U. S., 602; (T. D. 3321, C. B. I-1, 210)); (c) the simple method of calcula
tion is preferred (Edwards v. Slocum, 287 F., 651, 264 U. S., 61); (d) those
who set up an exception or exemption from taxation must establish it as being
within the words as well as within the reason of the provisos giving such
exception {Commercial Health & Accident Co. v. Pickering, 281 F., 539 (T. D.
3313, C. B. I-1, 256); Javierre v. Central Altagracia, 217 U. S., 502; Schlem
mer v. Railway Co., 205 U. S., 1; Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U. S., 418); (e) the
re-enactment of legislation after the construction of similar legislation by the
executive department would seem to be an approval of such construction;
(f) a regulation made in pursuance of an act of congress has the force of law.
Of course, whether the executive department uses algebra or arithmetic,
proportion or analysis, is immaterial. All methods should give the same
result, and the method depends upon the taste of the employee who figures the
amount.
That part of section 211 (b) which reads as follows: “ . . . the portion
of the tax imposed by this section attributable to such sale shall not exceed 20
per cent. of the selling price,” is the command of the lawmaker. It is a limita
tion upon the table contained in section 211 (a). That may not be done in
directly which can not be done directly. The collection of a tax greater than
that allowed in 211 (b) for a 211 (a) transaction can not be accomplished under
211 (a) by any rule or regulation. But the two must be harmonized and read
together. From the beginning income-tax legislation has evidenced a graduated
rate which is progressively higher as the income increases. The income of the
taxpayer is, therefore, the body at which the law is directed, and it must be
considered as a whole; otherwise there would be no effectiveness in such a
system of taxation. Section 211 (b) contains no suggestion that there is to be
any departure from this policy. Neither is there anything in the section under
scrutiny to warrant the placing of the amount received from the sale of a dis
covery property in any particular place in the income column. It gives com
plexion to the entire column. It adds its color to the entire accumulation for
the income period. The only irrefutable method known to mathematics for
the ascertainment of the participation in such a whole by a particular part is
by proportion.
This is the method that the government agents adopted.
That the government method may be proven faulty by assuming that the
plaintiffs’ method is correct or that the defendant’s method is faulty by assum
ing that the government’s method is correct is not the proper test. Neither
may be championed as correct until proven so by the eyes of the full purposes
of law.
The plaintiffs have paid their surtax calculated upon the theory that their
entire income, that which falls under 211 (a) as well as that which falls under
211 (b), made up an entirety without any particular location for either one,
and they have had the benefit of the deduction provided for in 211 (b) on such
a basis. This payment appears to have been correct.
Any other system would defeat the basis rock of the income-tax theory.
It would be like attributing a part of a youth’s body to growth during the
year 1925, when, as a matter of fact, 1925 contributed to the entire body,
and entered into the shape and growth and fashioning of it all.
Judgment will be entered for the defendants.
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(T. D. 3850, April 8, 1926)
Article 1040: Interest on refunds and judgments.
(Also section 252, article 1031.)
Income tax—Revenue act of 1921—Decision of supreme court
1. Interest—Claims for Refund and Credit—Certificate of
Overassessment—Schedule—Date of Approval—Date of
Allowance.
Under sections 250 (b), 252, and 1324 (a) of the revenue act of
1921, the date of allowance to which interest is payable on credits
and refunds is the date of final approval by the commissioner and
not the date when the commissioner first determines that an over
assessment should be made and transmits the schedule to the collector
and not the date of final payment.
2. Same—Specific Protest.
Under section 1324 of the revenue act of 1921 interest is payable
from the date of payment of the tax only where the taxpayer makes
a specific protest, setting forth in detail the basis and reasons for such
protest. Otherwise interest is payable from six months after the
date of filing the claim for refund or credit.
3. Same—Discount
Interest is not payable on the discount of 3 per centum allowed
for early payment by section 1009 of the revenue act of 1917.
The following decision of the United States supreme court in the case of
Girard Trust Co. et al., Trustees of Moore, v. United States is published for the
information of internal-revenue officers and others concerned.
Supreme Court of the United States
Girard Trust Co., George Stevenson, William R. Verner, et al., appellants, v.
The United States
Appeal from the Court of Claims
[March 1, 1926.]
Mr. Chief Justice Taft delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the court of claims under section
242 of the Judicial Code. The judgment was entered May 19, 1924, and the
appeal was allowed July 3, 1924. The judgment dismissed the petition of the
plaintiffs upon findings of fact. The Girard Trust Co., and the other appellants
are trustees of the estate of Alfred F. Moore, deceased.
Their claims are for interest not paid on refunds of taxes paid them. The
proposed income tax upon the Moore estate for 1920, as originally returned
early in 1921, was $196,202.61. On March 15, 1921, and on June 15, 1921,
quarterly payments of the tax, which amounted to $49,050.66, were paid to the
collector. On August 2, 1921, the trustees for the estate filed a claim for the
refund of the two instalments, aggregating $98,101.32, already paid, and claim
for abatement of the two remaining quarterly instalments not yet paid,
aggregating the same amount. The claim for abatement was allowed in its
entirety, and the claim for the refund in large part. The action of the de
partment began December 9, 1922, in a schedule form, signed by the com
missioner of internal revenue, including an item of overassessments, and
marked, "Approved by the commissioner of internal revenue, for trans
mission to the proper accounting officers for credit and refund.” This was
transmitted to the collector of internal revenue for the first district of Pennsyl
vania to examine the account of the taxpayer, to report back the amount to be
refunded and the amount to be credited on taxes due and unpaid. The col
lector made the report. The assistant commissioner of internal revenue
confirmed the report, and the commissioner directed the refund January 16,
1923. On February 20, 1923, the trustees received by mail a certificate of
overassessment dated February 10, 1923, stating that since $196,202.61 was
assessed, whereas $13,663.89 was the correct tax, there had been an over-
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assessment of $182,538.72, and that the amount of this overassessment had been
applied as follows:
Amount abated........................................................... $98,101.29
Amount credited.........................................................
21.41
Amount refunded........................................................
84,416.02
With this certificate was a cheque for $84,416.02, the amount of the refund
without interest. Since filing the petition in this case the trustees received,
under date of October 5,1923, a cheque for $4,318.97, interest on the refund and
the credit of $21.41 from six months after the filing of the claim for refund to
December 9, 1922.
Moore’s estate made return to the collector of internal revenue for excess
profits tax for the year 1917 of $108,140.15, and on March 21, 1918, paid to
the collector of internal revenue $108,372.36, the amount of the tax less the
credit of $767.79 allowed for payment in advance of the time fixed by law,
June 15, 1918. Ascertaining that the trustees of a trust estate were not
subject to excess-profits tax, on August 2, 1921, they filed a claim for refund
of the entire tax of $108,140.15. This claim was approved by the commis
sioner of internal revenue for $107,372.36 on December 9,1922, under the pre
scribed schedule form in which this item was marked “approved by the
commissioner of internal revenue, for transmission to the proper accounting
officer for credit and refund.” It was sent to the proper collector of internal
revenue, who reported it back to the bureau. It was approved by the as
sistant commissioner, and the refund was finally approved by the commis
sioner, January 16, 1923. On February 1, 1923, the plaintiffs received by mail
a certificate of overassessment, dated February 6, 1923, for $107,372.36, to
gether with a cheque for $112,864.53, the difference $5,492.17 being interest on
the amount refunded from the date six months after the filing of the claim
to December 9, 1922.
The contentions of the trustees are that the allowances of interest on the
refunds are not sufficient under the statute. Section 250 (b) of the revenue
act of November 23, 1921 (42 Stat., 227, 264, ch. 136), provides:
“As soon as practicable after the return is filed, the commissioner shall
examine it. If it then appears that the correct amount of the tax is greater
or less than that shown in the return, the instalments shall be recomputed.
If the amount already paid exceeds that which should have been paid on
the basis of the instalments as recomputed, the excess so paid shall be credited
against the subsequent instalments; and if the amount already paid exceeds
the correct amount of the tax, the excess shall be credited or refunded to the
taxpayer in accordance with the provisions of section 252.”
Section 252 of the above act (42 Stat., 268) provides:
“That if, upon examination of any return ... it appears that an amount of
income, war-profits or excess-profits tax has been paid in excess of that properly
due, then, notwithstanding the provisions of section 3228 of the Revised
Statutes, the amount of the excess shall be credited against any income, war
profits or excess-profits taxes, or instalment thereof, then due from the taxpayer
under any other return, and any balance of such excess shall be immediately
refunded to the taxpayer. ...”
Section 1324 (a) of the same statute (42 Stat., 316) contains the provision
as to interest as follows:
“That upon the allowance of a claim for the refund of or credit for internal
revenue taxes paid, interest shall be allowed and paid upon the total amount
of such refund or credit at the rate of one-half of 1 per centum per month
to the date of such allowance, as follows: (1) If such amount was paid under
a specific protest setting forth in detail the basis of and reasons for such
protest, from the time when such tax was paid, or (2) if such amount was not
paid under protest but pursuant to an additional assessment, from the time
such additional assessment was paid, or (3) if no protest was made and the
tax was not paid pursuant to an additional assessment, from six months after
the date of filing of such claim for refund or credit. The term ‘additional
assessment’ as used in this section means a further assessment for a tax of
the same character previously paid in part.”
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The claims made by the trustees, appellant here, are, first, that the govern
ment erred in its construction of section 1324, by which it allowed interest
not to the dates of payments of the refunds, February 20 and February 2,
1923, but only to the date when the commissioner approved the schedule
finding the amount of the overassessments and transmitted the schedule to
the accounting officers, December 9, 1922. The interest between December 9,
1922, down to the dates of payment amounts to $2,028.11. The question is
whether the words “to the date of the allowance” means to the date of the
decision of the commissioner that an overassessment has been made, i. e.,
to December 9, 1922, to the final approval of the refund by the commissioner,
January 16, 1923, or to the date of payment.
The next claim of the trustees is for $3,889.67, and this turns on the ques
tion whether under section 1324 the interest on the refund for the 1920 taxes
should be calculated under clause (1) in that section as for a payment made
under a specific protest or whether as upon a payment under clause (3) for
which no protest was made. The commissioner held that no sufficient protest
had been made and therefore allowed interest, not from the time of payment
as provided under clause (1), but from six months after the filing of the claim
for refund under clause (3), which made a difference of $3,889.67.
The third claim of the trustees is for $767.79. This is based on the fact
that under the revenue act of October 3, 1917 (40 Stat., 300, 326, ch. 63 sec.
1009), a credit on taxes to be paid in advance, calculated at the rate of 3
per cent. per annum upon the amount so paid from the date of payment to
the date fixed by law for payment, was allowed and the amount paid was
$767.79 less than the amount assessed. The claim for refund was allowed
for the amount actually paid, but not for the discount. The trustees now
seek to recover the discount.
The court of claims dismissed the petition for all these claims on the authority
of Stewart v. Barnes (153 U. S. 456). The taxpayer in that case had already
received and accepted the principal of the amount improperly collected
by a collector of internal revenue, and this was an action for the interest. This
court held that the taxpayer could not maintain an independent action for in
terest, for the reason that in such cases interest is considered as damages, does
not form the basis of the action, and is only an incident to the recovery of the
principal debt. We do not think that it controls this case. The payment of
interest in the Stewart case was not expressly provided for in the act. In this
case there is statutory provision for it, and it is analogous to a suit in debt
or covenant in which the contract specifically provides for payment of interest
on the principal debt. In such cases the authorities all hold that the ac
ceptance of the payment of the principal debt does not preclude a further
suit for the interest unpaid. (Fake v. Eddy, 15 Wend. (N. Y.), 76; Kimball v.
Williams, 36 App. D. C., 43; New York Trust Co. v. Detroit Railway Co.,
251 Fed., 514; King v. Phillips, 95 N. C., 245; Bennett v. Federal Coal & Coke
Co., 70 W. Va., 456; Robbins v. Cheek, 32 Ind., 328.) And the same rule
obtains where the obligation is one that by statute bears interest. (National
Bank v. Mechanic's National Bank, 94 U. S., 437; Hobbs v. United States,
19 Ct. Cls., 220; New York v. United States, 31 Ct. Cls., 276; Crane v. Craig,
230 N. Y., 452; Bowen v. Minneapolis, 47 Minn., 115; Blair v. United States
ex rel. Birkenstock, 6 Fed. (2d) 679).)
We are therefore brought to the merits of the case. First, what is the
meaning in section 1324 of the words “to the date of such allowance” to
which interest is to be paid on refunds? The treasury department by its
regulations of 1922 construed this provision as follows:
“A claim for refund or credit is allowed within the meaning of the statute
when the commissioner approves the schedule in whole or in part, for trans
mission to the proper accounting officer, for credit or refund.”
And this is the holding of the comptroller general (1 decisions compt.
gen., 411, 412). He says:
“To compute interest to the date of actual payment . . . would be wholly
impracticable from an administrative standpoint, and I have no doubt that
this phase of the matter was considered by the congress in providing that the
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interest should be allowed to the date of allowance rather than to the date of
payment of the claim.”
If congress had intended that interest should be allowed to the date of the
payment, it seems to us it would have said so. Allowance in its ordinary
sense does not mean payment, and in the practical administration of the
treasury department the two things are quite different. The one is a deci
sion by the competent authority that the payment should be made. The other
is the actual payment. The commissioner of internal revenue is the final
judge in the administrative branch of the government to decide that an over
assessment has been made and that a refund or credit should be granted,
and when he has made that decision finally he has allowed the claim for the
refund or credit of the taxes paid within the meaning of the section.
It is said that this is a remedial statute and was intended to require the
government to recoup the taxpayer unjustly dealt with by paying interest
during the whole time the money was detained. That was doubtless its general
purpose. But the statute is to be construed in the light of the difficulties of
the government bookkeeping and accounting. To have made the interest cal
culable to the date of actual payment would have led to uncertainty and
confusion, as the comptroller general indicates, and it was doubtless for that
reason that congress qualified its desire to pay interest for the exact time
during which the money was detained to a date which was practical from an
administrative standpoint. Nor does the fact that, pending the carrying out
of the direction of the commissioner of internal revenue to make the refund,
he might reverse himself, change the finality of his decision allowing the
refund. If he does so, the date fixed as the date of the allowance under the
section is changed, of course, but the mere fact that he can reverse a final
allowance does not prevent its being a final allowance, any more than when
a court renders a judgment, its ability within the term to set it aside or
change its affects its finality, if it is not changed. We think, therefore that the
words ‘‘to the date of such allowance” do not carry interest to be paid on
refunds down to the time of payment.
We can not concur, however, in the view of the treasury department that
the date of the allowance of the claim as intended by the statute is the date
when the commissioner first decides that there has been an overassessment
and sends upon a proper form his decision to the collector of internal revenue
who made the collection and keeps the account with the taxpayer. The find
ings and the exhibits show that the course of business is that the collector, on
receiving from the commissioner the schedule as to the overassessment,
examines his books and reports back to the bureau the amount which should
be credited on taxes due and the amount to be refunded; that this is examined
by the assistant commissioner and then is delivered to the commissioner,
who makes it effective by his approval. Until it reaches him and is approved
by him, the refund can not be paid. This, we think, is the real date of allow
ance. Until that time, the exact amount of the refund is not fixed finally
by competent authority. This date would seem to be just as certain and
convenient from an administrative standpoint as that of the original decision
of the commissioner, and it is certainly more in conformity to the general
purpose of congress to relieve the overassessed taxpayer by paying com
pensatory interest on money unjustly taken and kept by the government.
We think, therefore, that the trustees are entitled to recover from the gov
ernment interest on both the refund for the taxes of 1917 and that for those
of 1920 from December 9, 1922, to January 16, 1923.
Second. This second claim turns on the provisos of section 1324 with ref
erence to protests. The trustees attached to their original return of income
tax for 1920 the following protest:
‘‘Note.—Profit was made during the year 1920 upon sales of capital assets
as set forth in block C above. This amount of $349,200.85 is included in the
total net income and under regulations is returned for tax on form 1040.
As the taxpayer is advised that such sum is not taxable income, under the
decision of Brewster v. Walsh (district court for district of Connecticut, made
December 16, 1920), the report of the amount of such profit is made and
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tax paid thereon only under protest, and only in compliance with the require
ment of the foregoing form and the instructions thereon.”
Both the instalments of the income tax paid March 15th and June 15th were
paid under this protest. On the 15th of June, however, there was added to
the protest the following memorandum:
“ In view of the joint investigation by accountants of both government and
trustees now in progress, with the agreed object of correcting certain figures,
especially those relating to depreciation, believed to have been erroneously
increased as to the most important item and ignored as to another item, in
the 1920 return of said trustees covering the sale of the three capital assets
in that return set forth, estimating the total of said profits and the tax pay
able thereon out of the trust estate.
“Inasmuch as the second quarterly instalment of $49,050.60, based upon
said estimate, is now due, you are hereby notified that the accompanying
payment thereof is made without prejudice to the right of said trust estate
to be hereafter relieved from or reimbursed for the payment of any tax upon
the profits so returned in excess of the total tax, resulting from such final
adjustment thereof as may be determined, either by agreement, or by the
courts. ...”
The government’s contention is that the distinction made in section 1324, by
which the amount of interest to be paid on refunded taxes is to date from
the payment of the taxes in cases where there is a specific protest setting
forth in detail the basis and reasons for such protest, and by which the inter
est is to be dated only from six months after the date of filing the claim for
refund or credit when there is no protest, was intended to favor those who
furnished to the collecting officers by way of specific protest a valid basis
for a refund of the taxes.
We agree with this view. To hold otherwise would be to invite a protest
on any pretended ground by taxpayers in every case of payment and would
make the protest of no value to the treasury or the collecting officers. A pro
test is for the purpose of inviting attention of the taxing officers to the illegality
of the collection, so that they may take remedial measures at once. But if
protests are based on reasons of no validity, they do not accomplish the public
purpose for which they are revised.
In the present case, the protest was based on a decision of the district court
of Connecticut made December 16, 1920 (Brewster v. Walsh, 268 Fed., 207.)
That case was reversed in Walsh v. Brewster (255 U. S., 536), March 28, 1921,
or more than two months before the payment of the June 15th instalment by
the trustees. The statement added under the June 15th instalment was merely
a recital that an investigation was going on between the government and the
trustees, and that if that turned out to be in excess of the right amount, the
payment was without prejudice to the recovery of the excess. This was
certainly not a protest for specific reasons in accordance with the requirements
of the statute. For these reasons, we think that no recovery can be had for
failure to allow interest for the period of the six months after the date of payment.
Third. The third item of the recovery here sought is for the $767 of discount
allowed by the government upon the amount returned for taxation on the in
come for 1917 by the trustees on the excess-profits tax. The tax assessed was
$108,140.15. It was not due until June 15, 1918. Under section 1009 of the
revenue act of October 3, 1917 (40 Stat., 300, ch. 63), it was provided that
the secretary of the treasury, under rules and regulations prescribed by him,
should permit taxpayers liable to income and excess-profits taxes to make pay
ments in advance in instalments or in whole of an amount not in excess of the
estimated taxes which would be due from them, provided that the secretary of
the treasury, under rules and regulations prescribed by him, might allow credit
against such taxes so paid in advance of an amount not exceeding 3 per
centum per annum calculated upon the amount so paid from the date of such
payment to the date fixed by law for such payment, but that no such credit
should be allowed on payments in excess of taxes determined to be due.
We do not see the basis upon which such recovery can be had. The taxpayer
can not obtain a refund under the other sections quoted except for taxes paid.
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By reason of his payment earlier than required, he has been permitted to reduce
the amount which he actually paid. But there is no provision in the statute
for a recovery of anything but what he did pay, or for interest on anything
but on what he did pay. We think that if congress intended him to recover
interest for his accommodation of the government by a premature payment
of his taxes illegally collected, it would have made a specific provision for it
and have given the commissioner special authority.
This disposes of the three claims. The conclusion of the court of claims is
therefore affirmed in all respects except as to the interest on the refunds on
the taxes illegally collected for the year 1917, and for the year 1920 for the
period from the 9th of December, 1922, to January 16, 1923, which the trustees
should recover.
The judgment is therefore reversed and the cause is remanded to the court
of claims with directions to enter a judgment in accordance with this opinion.
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